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RECENT DECISIONS
the evidence illegally obtained on the ground that when the right to
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures is weighed against
the public policy of suppressing crime, the individual right is deemed
to be subordinate to this policy.
2 4
It is submitted that this reasoning is both erroneous and dan-
gerous. Since the arbitrary utilization of the power to arrest and
search is a step towards a totalitarian state, it would seem to follow
that the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment should be considered
as one of those fundamental rights protected by the "due process
clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONFESSIONS AND DUE PROCESS.-
Petitioner was convicted of murder while attempting to commit
rape. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indiana.'
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
reviewing the facts, found that the police, in attempting to procure
a confession from the petitioner, had questioned him for five to ten
hours on six separate days. He was kept two days in solitary con-
finement in a cell called "the hole." He was never given sufficient
food or rest during this period to satisfy normal needs. Petitioner
was not given a prompt preliminary hearing as required by Indiana
law; he was without friendly or professional aid and was not advised
of his constitutional rights. Held, conviction reversed. The coercive
methods employed by the police officials to elicit the confession were
unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
The Watts case was the first of three cases decided the same
day, all reversing convictions where confessions had been obtained
through coercion.3
In reviewing cases of this nature, the Supreme Court is not
concluded by the findings of a state court that the confession was
24 In coming to this conclusion the Court relied upon People v. Defore, 242
N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 586 (1926).
1 Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N. E. 2d 846 (1948).
2 U. S. CO,qST. AmrFND. XIV, § 1. ". . . nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .....
3 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949). The petitioner was con-
stantly interrogated from four to six hours a day for five days. He was
denied the right to see friends or relatives and was not informed of his right
to remain silent. The suspect was not given a preliminary hearing until the
interrogation had produced a confession. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S.
68 (1949). Here the suspect was held in jail several days and on one occasion
was interrogated for a twelve-hour period. He was not given a hearing or
informed of his rights. Petitioner was denied benefit of consultation with an
attorney or friends.
1950 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
voluntary, but may make an independent determination of this fact. 4
It has the power to set aside a conviction even though the evidence
apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the
verdict.5 Where the facts show that the confession was acquired
solely through physical torture, it will be treated as void.6 If the
suspect is in such poor physical condition that he would readily con-
fess anything, the Court will view the proceedings with great care.
An analysis of the cases readily shows that the so called "third
degree" is used principally on the ignorant and those holding a
humble place in society; and therefore, the age of the prisoner,8 his
intelligence ' and even his personality 10 are important measuring
rods to determine whether his liberty has been unlawfully impaired.
The mere fact that the confession was obtained during police in-
terrogation does not render it invalid," nor does the Constitution
forbid the use of a subsequent voluntary confession after the police
have obtained an unlawful one.' 2
Although a general rule cannot be laid down to determine when
a confession is invalid, 13 the Supreme Court usually tries to ascertain
whether it can be considered as issuing from an individual with a
free choice 14 and whether it is trustworthy.15 In determining this
question the Court will first make a review of all the pre-trial abuses
and then ask whether they were of such a nature as would reason-
ably influence the veracity of the confession. If the question is
4 Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; Chambers et al. v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227 (1940).
5 Malinski et al. v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945).
6 Brown et al. v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).7 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1 (1924). Wan was inter-
rogated continually though very ill from an attack of Spanish influenza.
8 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948). The Court in this case took into
consideration the youthfulness of the suspect and even stated that the formal
act of advising the youth of his rights immediately before he signed the con-
fession did not alter the result. The reasoning of the Court was that such a
youngster would not be able to appreciate mere formal declarations.9 Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547 (1942) (ignorant youth); White v. Texas,
310 U. S. 530 (1940) (illiterate farm hand).
10 "He exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost his
freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the result
of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941).
11 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
12 Ibid.
13 See Betts v. Brady, Warden, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942).
14Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U. S. 596 (1944) ; Hysler v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411 (1942) ; Wilson v. United
States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896).
15 One of the arguments in the dissenting opinion of the principal case was
that in revealing certain facts at the trial, several of the admissions contained
in the confession were substantiated. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 60 (1949-).
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answered in the affirmative the confession is said to be involuntary.18
While it may be true that the facts in the Watts case are not unique,
the language of the Court indicates that it will demand a stricter
enforcement of the individual's rights. The Court, in short, states that
regardless of whether the confession can be said to be trustworthy
or to have been given with mental freedom, if it is the product of
improper police procedure it cannot be regarded as lawful.17 The
Court points out that it is the historic function of the due process
clause to assure the individual of proper procedure before his liberty
is curtailed,' s and regards the decision of the Indiana Court as
violating that function.'9 The dissenting argument in the Supreme
Court decision that injustice might occur in particular cases and that
police officials would be unduly burdened is best answered by the
majority's statement: "But the history of the criminal law proves
overwhelmingly that brutal methods of law enforcement are essen-
tially self-defeating, whatever may be their effect in a particular
case." 20
Although the Court realizes that unwarranted restrictions on
police officials would retard the administration of the criminal law,
it will not tolerate those actions which infringe upon the individual's
constitutional rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - RELEASED TIME PROGRAM IN NEW
YORK. - Petitioner, a citizen and taxpayer, and parent of children
attending public school, sought to review the determination of the
Board of Education in establishing the "released time" program of
religious instruction with the ultimate aim of compelling the discon-
tinuance of such program. Petitioner contended that such program
was violative of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Held, petition dismissed as a matter of law. The
First Amendment was not violated by the "released time" program
as conducted in New York City. To restrain authorized educational
agencies from granting released time for these purposes would be a
suppression of the right to freedom of religion which is guaranteed
26 "In short, the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Wilson
v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896).
17 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
Is Ibid.; accord, U. S. ex reL. Montgomery v. Rager, 86 F. Supp. 382, 388
(N. D. Ill. 1949). The court in this case stresses that due process means the
due course of proceedings in the administration of justice.
19 See note 1 supra. The Indiana court stated in substance that if the con-
fession was not given through fear or inducement, then the previous police
procedure is unimportant.
20 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 55 (1949).
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